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Abstract
This paper examines how a concentrated tenant base affects the operating performance 
and market valuations of US REITs. We observe that REITs adopting a concentrated ten-
ant base present higher corporate cash flows and lower expenses. However, we identify a 
concentration discount effect that REITs with a more concentrated tenant base experience 
lower market valuations. We argue that this concentration discount is a result of the trade-
offs between the impacts of the tenant base on the operating performance, risk levels and 
growth potentials. We find that a concentrated tenant base is associated with higher liquid-
ity risk and lower dividend growth, resulting in an inflated discount factor. Our findings are 
not subject to sub-samples of focused or diversified REITs and stay robust after correcting 
for the selection bias as well as controlling for the lease structure, tenant quality and anchor 
tenant effect.r
Keywords Tenant concentration · REIT performance · REIT valuations · Herfindahl index
JEL Classification L25 · G30 · G32
1 Introduction
Concentrate or diversify? This is an extensively researched question in the business lit-
erature where the benefits are weighed against the costs associated with a diversified or 
concentrated strategy in order to determine the net impact on a firm’s financial perfor-
mance or market valuations. While the first thing we learn about risk management is not 
to put all the eggs in one basket, this branch of literature suggests that diversification 
does not necessary improve the firm value due to the associated costs. Following the 
 * Chen Zheng 
 chen.zheng@henley.ac.uk
 Bing Zhu 
 b.zhu@tum.de
1 Department of Real Estate and Planning, Henley Business School, University of Reading, 
Reading RG6 6AH, UK
2 Department of Civil, Geo and Environmental Engineering, Technical University of Munich, 
Arcisstraße 21, 80333 Munich, Germany
 C. Zheng, B. Zhu 
1 3
seminal paper by Montgomery (1994) who finds that firms with a concentrated business 
strategy perform better than their diversified counterparts, the emerging literature gener-
ally supports a diversification discount, or concentration premium, effect. The negative 
impact of diversification on the firm performance and asset valuations has been widely 
recorded across different industries (Berger and Ofek 1995; Campbell et al. 2003; Com-
ment and Jarrell 1995; Hund et al. 2010).
Due to the complex nature of the definition of diversification at the corporate level, 
most of the empirical studies examine the diversification of the underlying business 
lines, i.e. SIC-defined sectors or assets. Capozza and Seguin (1999) propose REITs as 
an ideal testing lab to create accurate measures of diversification due to the simplic-
ity and transparency of the underlying asset holdings of REITs. Most studies following 
Capozza and Seguin (1999) find a discount effect of both property type and property 
location diversification on REIT valuations (Cronqvist et al. 2001; Campbell et al. 2003; 
García and Norli 2012; Kang and Kim 2008; Landier et al. 2009).
As REITs hold a substantial amount of “hard assets” and their growth heavily rely 
on rental income producing properties (Lu et al. 2015), the underlying tenant base is as 
important a factor as the asset type and geography to a REIT’s success. However, the 
research on tenants is surprisingly scarce despite the fact that a REIT, as a corporate, 
often places tenants at the center of its business. This paper represents a first attempt to 
extend the corporate concentration concept to the tenant level and empirically test the 
impact of tenant concentration on REITs operating performance and market valuations.
We follow Capozza and Seguin (1999) and exploit the conceptual framework of the 
REIT business by testing the impact of tenant concentration on a REIT’s cash flows, 
expenses and determinants of its market valuation. While a limited number of studies 
focus on how tenants affect the corporate behaviors of REITs, such as the financing 
choice and liquid management (Liu and Liu 2013; Lu-Andrews 2017; Liu et al. 2019), 
our study provides the first set of empirical tests on a direct relationship between ten-
ants’ characteristics and REIT performance as well as valuations. The contributions of 
this study are threefold.
Firstly, we find that REITs adopting a concentration strategy for the underlying tenant 
base present better operating performance. Specifically, REITs with more concentrated ten-
ants present higher property-level cash flows and lower expenses, including management 
costs and financial expenses, leading to considerably higher corporate-level cash flows. 
This supports the argument that suppliers with concentrated customers can improve their 
operating efficiency by establishing a long-term stable relationship with their customers 
(Patatoukas 2012; Irvine et al. 2016).
Secondly, we identify a discount effect of tenant concentration (hereafter concentration 
discount effect) on REITs market value despite its positive effect on the operating perfor-
mance. We find that REITs with a more concentrated tenant base experience lower valua-
tions measured by price-to-FFO ratio, market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q, which is in con-
trast to the diversification discount effect that has been widely documented in the finance 
and real estate literature. This concentration discount effect holds after we control for the 
property type and geographic concentration. More interestingly, we find that REITs with 
a more concentrated tenant base are associated with lower liquidity and lower dividend 
growth, indicating a higher required return, hence a higher discount rate, which ultimately 
explains the concentration discount in valuations.
Thirdly, this study adds to the REIT diversification literature by introducing a third 
dimension other than asset type and property location diversification; it represents a 
first attempt to propose a precise measure of tenant concentration at the REIT level by 
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constructing the Herfindahl index based on the shares of tenants’ contributions to the over-
all rental revenues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 briefly reviews the relevant litera-
ture and develops the hypotheses; Sect. 3 summarizes the sample selection, variable con-
struction and methodology; Sect. 4 discusses the empirical results, followed by a series of 
robustness tests in Sect. 5; the final section concludes.
2  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1  Concentration and Corporate Value
Montgomery (1994) presents the first attempt to summarize the relevant empirical evi-
dence of the relation between corporate focus and value, concluding that diversification 
does not necessarily improve firm performance. On the contrary, he finds that concentrated 
firms tend to perform better than diversified ones, a phenomenon that is referred to as the 
“diversification discount” in the literature. Early studies exclusively focus on the diversi-
fication of business lines across different industries and generally support a negative rela-
tionship between the firm-level diversification and firm value (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger 
and Ofek 1995; Comment and Jarrell 1995; Chen and Chen 2011; Bielstein et al. 2018).
One dominant explanation for this discount effect is the latent costs associated with the 
agency and transparency problems of diversified firms (Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Lamont 
and Polk 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003; Ahn and Denis 2004; Cheng and Wu 2018). 
Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan et al. (2000) find that the internal capital market could fail 
as the level of diversification across business lines increases. The managers of the stand-
alone divisions in a diversified firm have better opportunities to focus on self-interests and 
engage in rent-seeking, leading to inefficient resource allocations. Krishnaswami and Sub-
ramaniamb (1999) argue that it is the increased information asymmetry associated with a 
diversified structure that causes the discount effect. However, the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the information asymmetry and the diversification discount is rather 
mixed (Hadlock et al. 2001; Thomas 2002; Best et al. 2004).
Recent research development on the relationship between customer concentration and 
supplier performance suggests two competing theories: 1) suppliers’ performance is pun-
ished due to the increasing bargaining power of major concentrated customers as well as 
the increased cash flow risk associated with a concentrated customer base (Lee et al. 2020); 
2) suppliers can also benefit from a concentrated customer base by establishing a stable 
customer–supplier relationship and achieving operating efficiency (Kwak and Kim 2020). 
Although tenants are like customers to REITs because they are the cash flow generators, 
they also differ in that it is less likely for the tenants to find substituting suppliers supplying 
properties or spaces with similar qualities due to the nature of real estate business. There-
fore, the bargaining power perspective is naturally weakened, leaving REITs as an ideal 
laboratory to test the second theory.
REITs provide an ideal testing ground to construct more precise measures of diver-
sification across different dimensions. Given the simplicity of REITs holdings and the 
transparency in the corporate operation, REITs make it possible to examine the impact of 
diversification within a single industry on project- and corporate-level performance sep-
arately. REITs also allow us to explore whether diversification incurs more management 
costs given that the General and Administrative costs (G&A) of a REIT company is mainly 
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attributed to its management (Capozza and Seguin 1999). Capozza and Seguin (1999) find 
that the property-level cash flows of diversified REITs are actually higher, undermining 
the agency cost argument that managers in diversified firms are more likely to pursue less 
profitable projects. However, they find that this increased property-level cash flow does not 
benefit shareholders as the increased management costs associated with diversification off-
set it, leaving the corporate-level cash flows unaffected. Consistent with the diversification 
discount effect, they find that REITs with more concentrated portfolios experience higher 
valuations.
The following studies largely support this diversification discount in REITs (Cronqvist 
et al. 2001; Campbell et al. 2003; Kang and Kim 2008; Ro and Ziobrowski 2012). Cron-
qvist et  al. (2001) find that REITs focusing on one or two asset types experience a pre-
mium in the market value compared to REITs with more diversified asset types. Camp-
bell et al. (2003) find that a more geographically concentrated portfolio leads to a higher 
increase in shareholders’ wealth in property acquisitions. García and Norli (2012) extend 
the geographic concentration to general industrial companies and find that a higher level of 
geographic concentration is associated with higher excessive stock returns. Hartzell et al. 
(2014) and Ling et al. (2018b) also confirm a negative relationship between the REIT value 
and geographic diversification.
2.2  Tenant Quality and REIT Performance
The literature on the underlying tenants of REITs is limited due to the data availability as 
REITs are not required to disclose detailed information on tenants. Recent studies tend to 
focus on the quality of the tenants. By using a sample of retail REITs only, Liu and Liu 
(2013) find that REITs experience negative abnormal returns following the bankruptcy of 
their tenants. Lu-Andrews (2017) adopts direct measures of the tenant quality—tenants’ 
credit ratings and Altman Z-scores—and finds that the incentives to hold liquid assets are 
reduced for REITs with more quality tenants as better financial health of the tenants indi-
cate higher stability in a REIT’s cash flows. Liu et al. (2019) argue that higher tenant qual-
ity reflects better asset quality, leading to a higher liquidation value. Ambrose et al. (2018) 
represent the first attempt to study the concentration of the tenant base. They find that 
mortgages on retail properties with a more diversified tenant base present higher spreads 
than mortgages on single-tenant properties.
2.3  Hypothesis Development
The gross revenue at the property level is essentially a product of the net lettable area, 
the rental rate and the occupancy rate, each of which could be affected differently by 
tenant concentration. Given that more circulation space is needed when a building is 
occupied by more tenants, a more concentrated tenant base can increase the efficiency of 
the space. Tenants who require a block of space are less likely to relocate due to higher 
relocation expenses. Moreover, when REITs rely on a concentrated tenant strategy they 
care more about the tenant quality and long-term stability, indicating a lower turnover 
and higher occupancy rate (Lu-Andrews 2017). This increased stability comes with a 
potential price that these tenants are more likely to have greater negotiation power over 
the rental rate, as suggested by the literature on customer concentration (Kwak and Kim 
2020), which could reduce the aforementioned benefits. However, the greater heteroge-
neity in properties caused by the unique location and the characteristics of the buildings 
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means that it is much harder for major concentrated tenants to find substitutes for their 
desired property spaces. While the location might have a more direct effect on certain 
types of properties such as retail, the agglomerative effects associated with a property, 
widely documented by the agglomerative literature (Rosenthal and Strange 2020), indi-
cate that other properties, such as offices, are also hard to be substituted. Overall, it sug-
gests that, unlike customers who can easily find substitute suppliers, the concentrated 
tenants have only limited bargaining power. The discussion above suggests an overall 
enhanced cash flow generating ability of a concentrated tenant base. Therefore, we form 
our first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Tenant concentration has a positive effect on property-level cash flows.
The overall expenses of a REIT company are generally attributable to its property-
level operating costs, corporate-level management costs and financial expenses. While a 
more concentrated tenant base is easier for the property-level operation, it is also likely 
that the major tenants require better service, leading to higher operating costs. How-
ever, due to the increased simplicity of the lease terms, it is natural to think that a more 
concentrated tenant base requires lower management costs at the corporate level. We 
argue that a concentrated tenant strategy would also reduce the financial expenses as 
the increased transparency makes it easier for banks’ valuation practices. Therefore, we 
form our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: REITs with a more concentrated tenant base are associated with lower man-
agement and financial costs.
While a concentrated strategy might only have a weak impact on property-level cash 
flows, the reduction in corporate expenses indicates an overall positive impact of tenant 
concentration on corporate cash flows, hence our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 REITs with a more concentrated tenant base present higher corporate-level 
cash flows.
US REITs are required to hold at least 75% real estate assets, implying that the value 
of a REIT company is largely dependent on the value of its underlying assets. There-
fore, the fundamental determinants of a REIT’s value are the net operating income 
(NOI) from properties and the discount factor. In other words, the effect of the tenant 
concentration on REIT value is a trade-off of its impacts on the cash flows, risk levels 
and growth respectively. REITs relying on a concentrated tenant base for their income 
potentially present higher risk. Due to the nature of the business, the growth potential 
of a REIT company is related to its rent escalation. Given that the leases are usually 
mid- to long-term in the commercial real estate sector, the more it relies on a concen-
trated tenant base, the less room there is for a REIT company to review and re-negotiate 
the rent in the mid-term, indicating lower growth potentials. This increased risk and 
decreased growth potential result in an inflated discount factor of REITs with a more 
concentrated tenant base. This increased discount factor ultimately leads to a discount in 
the valuation. Therefore, we form our fourth hypothesis as follows:
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Hypothesis 4 REITs with a more concentrated tenant base experience lower valuations 
due to the increased liquidity risk and reduced growth potential.
3  Data and Methodology
We collect data for 204 listed US Equity REITs between 2003 and 2015. The data on com-
pany characteristics including the tenant information is collected from S&P Global Market 
Intelligence Database (formerly known as SNL Financials). Market Intelligence Database 
records the thirty largest tenants for each public REIT and the percentage of the total rev-
enue attributed to each tenant. It should be noted that Market Intelligence Database does 
not collect tenant information for Multi-family and Hotel REITs, hence these are not 
included in our sample. There are 104 Equity REITs with tenant information available with 
an average of 14 tenants reported for each REIT. While the total number of tenants for 
some REITs might be more than 30, the revenue generated by tenants ranked after 30 is 
trivial. Therefore, we believe that this is unlikely to systematically affect the accuracy of 
our Herfindahl index measure of tenant concentration and the estimations. Based on these 
104 REITs, we further collect data on tenant and firm characteristics to form an unbalanced 
panel over 13 years.
We use a variety of measures for the operating performance and market valuations of 
REIT companies. For cash flow performance, we measure the gross rental income (RENT), 
net operating income (NOI) and funds from operations (FFO). We use both property-level 
operating costs (OPCOST) and the firm-level G&A expenses (G&A) to measure the man-
agement costs. The financial cost is measured by the interest expenses (INTEREST). All of 
the operating measures are scaled by the total assets. To measure the market valuations, we 
use the share price to FFO (P/FFO), the market-to-book ratio (M/B), and Tobin’s Q (Q).
To explore the underlying channel through which tenant concentration affects market 
valuations of REITs, we model the determinants of the discount rate. Firstly, we include 
the turnover ratio to proxy for the liquidity risk (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Glascock and 
Lu-Andrews 2015; Alcock and Steiner 2018), which is computed as the trading volume of 
a company for a given year divided by the end-of-year outstanding value of the common 
stocks (TURNOVER). Barinov (2014) shows that the turnover ratio is positively related 
to the liquidity. Secondly, we use the dividend growth rate (DIVGROWTH) to proxy for 
REITs’ growth. REITs are income pass-through and tax efficient vehicles, i.e., the divi-
dends are exempt from tax. To maintain the tax-exempt status, one of the requirements is 
for REITs to pay at least 90% of their income as dividends. As any retained earnings are 
still subject to tax, REITs usually voluntarily pay more than the required minimum 90%, 
which means that REITs have little or no retained earnings and rely heavily on external 
funding. Due to the historic cost approach to record real estate assets under the US GAAP 
and the distortions caused by depreciations and capital gains/losses, net income does not 
represent the actual cash flow of a REIT company. Instead, a commonly used measure in 
the REIT industry is funds from operations (FFO) which adjusts the net income for depre-
ciation and net capital gains. Since FFO represents the actual cash available for distribution 
for US REITs, we calculate the dividend growth rate as the FFO growth rate, which is the 
difference between current and previous years, multiplied by the FFO payout ratio.
The classic way to account for market power or concentration is to construct the Herfin-
dahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). We follow this approach and construct the Herfindahl index 
at the tenant level (HHI_Tenant) to measure tenant concentration. The HHI measures the 
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concentration of properties of a REIT company across its tenants. Specifically, it is calcu-
lated by squaring the revenue share of each tenant with respect to the total revenues of all 
tenants for the given REIT i in a given year t, and then summing the squared shares across 
the tenants, as presented in Eq. (1):
where Hi,l,y is the revenue share of each tenant l for REIT i with l = 1, 2,…, L in year y. L 
is the total number of tenants of REIT i. HHI_Tenant ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 represent-
ing only one tenant of a REIT company and an absolute concentration. The lower the HHI 
value, the less focused the underlying tenant base of a REIT company is.
We also need to account for the corporate-level diversification of property types and 
locations. We follow the same approach to measure geographic and property type concen-
tration by using HHI measures. For geographic concentration (HHI_Geo), it is calculated 
by squaring the market share of properties located in each MSA with respect to the total 
size of properties for the given REIT i in a given year y, and then summing the squared 
shares across the MSAs, as presented in Eq. (2):
where Pi,l,y is the size (square feet) of properties of REIT i located in MSA l with l = 1, 
2,…, L in year y; Si,y is the total size of properties held by REIT i in year y; L is the total 
number of MSAs where REIT i invests.
Similarly, property type concentration (HHI_Type) is calculated as Eq. (3):
where Qi,l,y is the size (square feet) of properties of REIT i that belongs to type l with l = 1, 
2,…, L in year y; Si,y is the total size of properties held by REIT i in year y. L is the total 
number of asset types that REIT i holds.1
It is natural to think that REITs have greater incentives to adopt a concentrated tenant 
base when they can hold long-term leases or when their tenant quality is good. Therefore, 
it is important to control for the lease structure and tenant quality at REIT level. To capture 
the long-term lease, we follow the method used by Lu-Andrews (2017). For a given REIT, 



































1 For HHI_Geo and HHI_Type, we also use the adjusted cost as the shares in the Herfindahl index, follow-
ing Ling et al. (2018a). The adjusted cost is the maximum of (1) the reported book value, (2) the initial cost 
of the property, or (3) the historic cost of the property including capital expenditures and tax depreciation.
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where Rentexpiring 6 year+
i,t
 is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases 
expiring during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year; and 
Total Renti,t is the total value of the base rents for REIT i in year t.
According to Liu et al. (2019), real assets with longer lease maturity are of better qual-
ity which means the measure of the long-term lease also to some extent captures the tenant 
quality. We also follow Lu-Andrews (2017) and Liu et al. (2019) to compute the Altman 
Z-score (ALTMAN) as a more precise measure of the tenant quality. To do so, we manually 
identify the public tenants for each REIT and collect the firm-level financial data for all 
public tenants from DataStream. For a given tenant in a certain year, the Altman Z-score is 
calculated as Eq. (5):
where ALTMANl,y is the final Z-score for tenant l in year y; for tenant l in year y, CAl,y is 
the current assets; CLl,y is the current liabilities; REl,y is the retained earnings; EBITl,y is the 
earnings before interests and tax; BVl,y is the book value; SALESl,y is the sales revenue; TAl,y 
is the total assets; and TLl,y is the total liabilities. We then calculate the revenue weighted 
average Altman Z-score for each REIT as Eq. (6):
where ALTMANi,y is the Altman Z-score for REIT i in year y and Hi,l,y is the revenue share 
of tenant l as defined in Eq. (1).
We control for other firm characteristics as follows: the firm size defined as the log of 
the market capitalization (SIZE), the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by 
the book value of equity (D/E), the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH) 
defined as the annual growth of the real estate investment assets. When it comes to REIT 
performance studies, it is essential to account for the portfolio’s metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) geography as the risk is different across various geographic areas. It has been 
widely recorded by the literature and the industry that gateway MSAs often present invest-
ment advantages, hence are sought after by the investors. To control for the extent to which 
a REIT allocates its assets in major gateway MSAs, we calculate its total share of real 
estate assets in the 25 gateway MSAs (25MSA) as defined by Ling et al. (2018a).2 We also 
control for REIT type fixed effect.3
Table  1 presents the summary statistics for all the variables over our sample period 
between 2003 and 2015. The average tenant concentration (HHI_Tenant) is 0.13 with a 
standard deviation of 0.13, close to the geographic concentration (HHI_Geo). The property 























2 We follow Ling et  al. (2018a) and define the 25 MSAs as Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, 
Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Orlando, Phila-
delphia, Phoenix, Portland, Sacramento, Saint Louis, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, 
Tampa, and Washington, D.C.
3 We categorize our sample into Diversified, Office, Industrial and Retail REITs.
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Table 1  Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the operating performance, 
market valuations and concentration measures of the tenant base, 
property locations and property types as well as the tenant and firm 
characteristics for the full sample of equity REITs during the 2003–
2015 sample period. The operating performance measures include the 
gross rental income (REIT), net operating income (NOI), property-
level aggregated operating expenses (OPCOST), general and admin-
istrative expenses (G&A), interest expenses (INTEREST), and funds 
from operations (FFO), all presented as a share of the total assets. 
Market valuations include price-to-FFO (P/FFO), market-to-book 
value (M/B) and Tobins Q (Q). The tenant concentration is measured 
by the Herfindahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each 
tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic and property-type concentration 
is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type 
respectively) based on the shares of assets across MSAs and prop-
erty types respectively. LEASE measures the long-term lease which is 
the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring 
during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current fis-
cal year. ALTMAN is the Altman Z-score for the tenant quality. SIZE 
is the market capitalization of the REIT company, log-transformed in 
the regressions. D/E is the financial leverage defined as the total debt 
divided by the book value of equity. GROWTH is the growth rate of 
the real estate investments. 25MSA is the total share of properties 
located in MSA regions. TURNOVER is the total value of the trading 
volume of a company for a given year divided by the end-of-year out-
standing value of the common stocks. DIVGROWTH IS the dividend 
growth rate
Mean Median Std Max Min
Performance measures (Scaled by Total Assets)
 RENT 0.093 0.090 0.025 0.150 0.024
 NOI 0.036 0.036 0.020 0.101 0.000
 OPCOST 0.089 0.088 0.022 0.156 0.041
 G&A 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.064 0.000
 INTEREST 0.025 0.026 0.009 0.048 0.000
 FFO 0.055 0.051 0.025 0.140 − 0.026
Valuation measures
 P/FFO 2.544 2.590 0.426 4.086 0.636
 M/B 1.310 1.165 0.814 4.363 0.035
 Q 2.040 1.876 0.955 6.895 0.346
Concentration measures
 HHI_Tenant 0.128 0.081 0.127 1.000 0.037
 HHI_Geo 0.154 0.081 0.201 0.944 0.009
 HHI_Type 0.622 0.599 0.208 1.000 0.211
Tenant characteristics
 LEASE 0.110 0.111 0.045 0.332 0.000
 ALTMAN 1.982 2.025 1.631 12.349 − 2.090
Firm characteristics
 SIZE ($ Billion) 3.450 2.498 3.773 44.918 1.003
 D/E 1.419 1.229 1.237 14.211 0.000
 GROWTH 0.116 0.051 0.240 1.694 − 0.202
 25MSA 0.477 0.464 0.155 0.851 0.111
 TURNOVER 1.994 1.533 1.425 10.673 0.103
 DIVGROWTH 0.021 0.026 0.180 1.138 − 1.357
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given that US REITs are known for their asset specialization. Our sample reports an aver-
age Altman Z-score (ALTMAN) of 2, which is within a normal range (Liu et al. 2019). On 
average, 11% of the total operating leases have a mid- or long-term maturity that is longer 
than 5 years.4
We test our hypotheses by using a series of two-stage Fama and MacBeth regressions 
(Fama and MacBeth 1973) to allow the estimates to vary over time. In the first stage, for 
each year of our sample period, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
where yi,t represents one of the dependent variables for the operating performance and 
market valuations. HHI_Tenanti,t−1 is the Herfindahl index for tenant concentration, while 
Xm,i,t−1 represent the control variables for tenant and firm characteristics.
In the second stage, we use the time series of the regression coefficients and test if the 
average coefficient is significantly different from zero. To take into account serial correla-
tion in the coefficient estimates, we follow Ang et al. (2006) and compute Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors with four lags in the second stage.5
4  Main results
4.1  Tenant concentration and REIT operating performance
We firstly test the impact of tenant concentration on operating performance measures and 
the results are reported in Table 2. HHI_Tenant has returned positive coefficients on both 
RENT and NOI with a significance level of 5% and 1% respectively. A one standard devi-
ation increase in the level of tenant concentration results in a 18.5% standard deviation 
increase in the NOI,6 indicating that, for a REIT company, the benefits associated with a 
concentrated tenant base outweigh the potentially disadvantaged negotiation power over 
the rental rates. We find a strongly negative impact of HHI_Tenant on both G&A and 
INTEREST that a one standard deviation increase in the level of tenant concentration is 
associated with a 35.4% and a 16.2% standard deviation decrease in the management costs 
and financial expenses respectively, supporting our argument that a more concentrated ten-
ant base presents lower valuation uncertainty for creditors who will in turn charge lower 
interest rates. As a result of the positive effect on property-level cash flows and the negative 
effect on expenses, Model 6 has returned a significantly positive coefficient of HHI_Tenant 
on FFO, suggesting that REITs with a more concentrated tenant base on average present 
higher corporate cash flows. This result is also economically significant that a one standard 
deviation increase in the level of tenant concentration leads to a 30.6% standard deviation 
increase in FFO.
We find that both longer lease maturity and better tenant quality result in higher prop-
erty operating costs (Model 3), implying that the long-term good-quality tenants need 





6 As HHI measures cannot be interpreted directly, the economic impact is calculated as the coefficient mul-
tiplied by the standard deviation of the tenant concentration and then divided by the standard deviation of 
the NOI to total asset. For other variables, the economic impact is calculated in the same way.
5 The results based on the standard errors with one to four lags are robust.
4 In the “Appendix”, we present the correlation matrix of all the variables used in this study. We can see 
that our specification does not suffer from multicollinearity.
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better service and maintenance at the building level, which is in line with the argument 
that major concentrated customers can be costly to suppliers (Kwak and Kim 2020). Mean-
while, we find that long-term leases and good tenant quality are associated with lower cor-
porate-level management costs (G&A), supporting the argument that suppliers can benefit 
from increased operation efficiency with a concentrated customer base (Kwak and Kim 
2020).
We find a positive coefficient of HHI_Geo on RENT, suggesting that REITs with more 
geographically concentrated portfolios present higher gross rental incomes. One possi-
ble explanation is that when REITs locate assets in a concentrated area they can develop 
regional specialism which helps them to negotiate better rental rates. We find that more 
geographically concentrated REITs incur more property-level operating expenses (Model 
3 Table 2), which seems counterintuitive. However, this relationship is reversed and geo-
graphic concentration leads to lower property-level operating expenses after we correct 
for the selection bias (Model 3 Table  4). Feng et  al. (2019) find that the operation effi-
ciency decreases with increasing geographic concentration for more transparent REITs and 
a reverse relationship is recorded for less transparent REITs. Give the potential selection 
bias in our sample that larger and more transparent REITs tend to voluntarily report ten-
ant information, the results in Tables 2 and 4 support this nonlinear relation between geo-
graphic concentration and REIT operation efficiency documented by Feng et al. (2019).
The impact of HHI_Type on NOI and FFO is significantly positive (see Model 3 and 
5), suggesting that both operating costs and financial expenses are lower for REITs with a 
higher property type concentration, consistent with Capozza and Seguin (1999) who argue 
that property type concentration provides a simpler and more transparent asset base to 
manage and value.
Interestingly, we find that the share of investments in gateway MSA locations are 
negatively associated with property-level cash flows, management costs and financial 
expenses, implying that although on one hand the enhanced information about the core 
markets reduces the costs, on the other hand, the increased competition in the core markets 
squeezes the cash flows. As a trade-off, we find that REITs investing more on the core mar-
kets do not generate higher cash flows at the corporate level.
4.2  Tenant concentration and REIT valuation
We then examine how tenant concentration affects REIT value and the results are presented 
in Model 1 to 3 of Table 3. The coefficients of HHI_Tenant on all three valuation measures 
are negative with a 5% significance level, which is in sharp contrast to the majority of the 
empirical studies which support a positive relationship between corporate focus and value. 
This result is also economically significant that one standard deviation increase in tenant 
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concentration is associated with a 26.9%, 14.2% and 22.5% standard deviation decrease in 
P/FFO, M/B and Q values respectively. For property type concentration, we indeed iden-
tify a diversification discount effect that REITs with more concentrated asset types experi-
ence higher market valuations than their diversified rivals, consistent with previous empiri-
cal studies (Capozza and Seguin 1999; Cronqvist et al. 2001; Campbell et al. 2003; Ro and 
Ziobrowski 2012; García and Norli 2012).
Table 3  Tenant concentration, liquidity, growth and valuation
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015. The dependent variables are three different valuation measures including price-to-
FFO (P/FFO), market-to-Book value (M/B) and Tobin’s Q (Q), as well as two determinants for the discount 
factor including the turnover which is the total value of the trading volume of a company for a given year 
divided by the end-of-year outstanding value of the common stocks (TURNOVER) and the dividend growth 
rate (DIVGROWTH). The variable of interest is the tenant concentration which is measured by the Herfind-
ahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic and property 
type concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based 
on the shares of assets across MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the long-term 
lease (LEASE), which is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the 
sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year, and the tenant quality measured by the 
Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). The other control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company meas-
ured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total debt 
divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); and 
the total share of properties located in MSA regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of REIT 
types (TYPE). Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% or 10% 
respectively





HHI_Tenant − 0.8706** − 0.9094** − 1.6916** − 1.2981*** − 0.1287**
(0.3794) (0.5061) (0.7679) (0.3601) (0.0637)
HHI_Geo 0.3132 0.1099 − 0.3657* − 0.0384 0.0724
(0.3003) (0.2116) (0.2142) (0.1088) (0.0682)
HHI_Type 0.2374*** 0.6115*** 1.0905*** 0.6797* 0.0757
(0.0675) (0.2027) (0.3253) (0.4258) (0.0871)
SIZE 0.1252** 0.2470*** 0.2319 0.2871* − 0.0247
(0.0600) (0.0729) (0.1839) (0.1685) (0.0339)
D/E − 0.0829** 0.2692*** 0.0422 0.0961** − 0.0003
(0.0349) (0.0683) (0.0488) (0.0405) (0.0082)
GROWTH 0.3255** 0.6204 1.1647*** 0.1405 − 0.0173
(0.1685) (0.5412) (0.4347) (0.1969) (0.0740)
25MSA − 0.0584 0.0941 0.3672 − 0.5916*** − 0.0325
(0.1740) (0.2212) (0.3739) (0.2262) (0.0660)
LEASE − 1.0411 3.5206*** − 0.6568 1.4587 0.1577
(1.1398) (0.8136) (1.6548) (1.6425) (0.3970)
ALTMAN 0.0140 0.0053 − 0.0086 − 0.0307 0.0056
(0.0181) (0.0274) (0.0480) (0.0257) (0.0061)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 393 422 428 412 398
R2 0.6661 0.6233 0.6437 0.8539 0.5359
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We argue that the concentration discount effect on valuation is channeled through the 
discount factor; and we expect a higher discount factor associated with a more concentrated 
tenant base which offsets the increased cash flows. The discount factor is essentially deter-
mined by the required return, which reflects the risk level, and the growth of a company. 
The seminal study by Amihud and Mendeison (1988) points out that a higher return is 
required for a higher liquidity risk. Capozza and Seguin (1999) follow their argument and 
use liquidity to capture the discount rate. We follow both studies and use the liquidity as 
Table 4  Heckman two-stage regressions on operating performance
This table reports the results of the Heckman two-stage regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015, where the first stage estimates the probability of a REIT reporting its tenant informa-
tion. The six dependent variables are different measures of the operating performance including the gross 
rental income (REIT), net operating income (NOI), property operating expenses (OPCOST), general and 
administrative expenses (G&A), interest expenses (INTEREST), and funds from operations (FFO), all pre-
sented as a share of the total assets. The variable of interest is the tenant concentration which is measured 
by the Herfindahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic 
and property type concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respec-
tively) based on the shares of assets across MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the 
long-term lease (LEASE), which is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring 
during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year, and tenant quality measured by 
the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). The other control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company 
measured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total 
debt divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); 
and the total share of properties located in MSA regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of 

















IM Ratio − 0.0195 0.0179 0.1220** − 0.0080 0.0084 0.1216**
(0.1177) (0.0476) (0.0566) (0.0115) (0.0399) (0.0692)
HHI_Tenant 0.0730** − 0.0080 0.0264** − 0.0244*** − 0.0083** 0.0591***
(0.0299) (0.0166) (0.0104) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0106)
HHI_Geo − 1.2852*** 0.0237 0.0210*** − 0.0183* − 0.0016 − 0.0045 − 0.0122
(0.2217) (0.0183) (0.0077) (0.0109) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0138)
HHI_Type − 1.0673*** − 0.0218 − 0.0205** 0.0020 0.0011 − 0.0049 0.0058
(0.2063) (0.0227) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0040) (0.0084) (0.0144)
SIZE 0.3155*** 0.0008 0.0006 − 0.0130*** − 0.0036*** − 0.0034** − 0.0060**
(0.0507) (0.0070) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0027)
D/E 0.0076 0.0035 0.0019 0.0028** − 0.0005* 0.0046*** − 0.0013
(0.0413) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0014)
GROWTH 0.2269 − 0.0227 − 0.0220** − 0.0115 − 0.0025 − 0.0117*** 0.0027
(0.5636) (0.0177) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0130)
25MSA 0.5140* − 0.0231 0.0010 − 0.0135* − 0.0069** − 0.0159*** 0.0093
(0.3648) (0.0191) (0.0117) (0.0093) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0101)
LEASE − 0.0176 0.0610* 0.0579** − 0.0274* − 0.0003 0.0856**
(0.0591) (0.0396) (0.0302) (0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0341)
ALTMAN 0.0017 0.0033*** 0.0008 − 0.0005* 0.0006* 0.0008
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 1135 334 410 410 410 410 410
R2 0.3091 0.6517 0.5588 0.5827 0.4275 0.6453 0.5922
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a measure of the risk level. We also add the other important factor for the discount rate—
the growth of REITs. We run regressions on the trading turnover (TURNOVER) and the 
dividend growth rate (DIVGROWTH) which are proxies for the liquidity risk and growth 
potentials respectively. The results are reported in Model 4 and 5 of Table 3. We see that 
HHI_Tenant has a negative effect on TURNOVER, suggesting that REITs with a more con-
centrated tenant base experience a higher liquidity risk, hence a higher required return, 
consistent with Lee et  al. (2020) who argue that a concentrated customer base increases 
the corporate risk.7 Meanwhile, tenant concentration negatively impacts on the dividend 
growth rate with a 5% significance level. Overall, the discount factor for REITs with a 
concentrated tenant base shoots up as a result of the increased liquidity risk and decreased 
growth potentials, confirming our fourth hypothesis.
5  Robustness tests
5.1  Selection bias
We acknowledge that only about half of the REITs voluntarily report their tenants, which 
may raise concerns that our sample is not randomly distributed, i.e. larger or more transpar-
ent REITs are more likely to disclose their tenant information. To account for the poten-
tial selection bias, we conduct a Heckman correction based on a two-stage model: in the 
first stage, we estimate the probability of a REIT company reporting its tenant informa-
tion by using a Probit model based on all US REITs during our sample period8; in the 
second stage, we add the inverse Mills (IM) ratio obtained from the first stage as an addi-
tional regressor in order to correct for the selection bias. This Heckman two-stage model 
is applied to all regressions on operating performance and market valuations, with results 
reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. As expected, we can see from the Stage 1 results 
that the probability of a REIT company reporting tenant information increases with the 
level of diversification and firm size. However, the correction term, IM Ratio, is mostly 
insignificant at Stage 2 except for Model 3 and 6 in Table 4, indicating a low likelihood of 
selection bias.
While most of the results remain similar in Table 4, we see some reversed results on 
NOI and operating expenses which is likely to be driven by the potential selection bias. 
Instead of a reduction in the operating costs (see Table 2), we now find that higher ten-
ant concentration incurs higher operating costs at the property-level. One possible expla-
nation is that the relation between concentration and operation efficiency is non-linear. 
While larger or more transparent REITs enjoy improved operation efficiency with a more 
concentrated tenant base, smaller or less transparent REITs need to put in more effort to 
provide quality service to major concentrated tenants, leading to increased operating costs. 
Similarly, as discussed above, the reversed effects of HHI_Geo on NOI and OPCOST also 
7 To test whether the decreased liquidity is associated with the systematic or idiosyncratic risk, we test the 
impact of tenant concentration (HHI_Tenant) on the systematic and idiosyncratic risks of REITs which are 
calculated by using the Fama–French three-factor model. While we find no impact of HHI_Tenant on the 
systematic risk, we find a positive relation between tenant concentration and the idiosyncratic risk. This 
suggests that the liquidity risk associated with tenant concentration is unsystematic, which is expected as 
the tenant strategy is a company-specific operation and investment strategy. For parsimonious reasons, the 
results are not reported here.
8 Given that S&P Market Intelligence does not collect data on tenants for Multi-family and Hotel REITs, 
we exclude them from our first-stage estimations.
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Table 5  Heckman two-stage regressions on liquidity, growth and valuation
This table reports the results of the Heckman two-stage regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015, where the first stage estimates the probability of a REIT reporting its tenant infor-
mation. The dependent variables are three different valuation measures including price-to-FFO (P/FFO), 
market-to-Book value (M/B) and Tobin’s Q (Q), as well as two determinants for the discount factor includ-
ing the turnover which is the total value of the trading volume of a company for a given year divided by 
the end-of-year outstanding value of the common stocks (TURNOVER) and the dividend growth rate 
(DIVGROWTH). The variable of interest is the tenant concentration which is measured by the Herfindahl 
index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic and property type 
concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based on 
the shares of assets across MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the long-term lease 
(LEASE), which is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the sixth 
and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year, and the tenant quality measured by the Alt-
man Z-score (ALTMAN). The other control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company meas-
ured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total debt 
divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); and 
the total share of properties located in MSA regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of REIT 













IM Ratio − 0.6060 2.8155 − 0.5402 1.6027 − 0.1245
(1.4396) (2.4637) (1.3655) (1.3409) (0.3338)
HHI_Tenant − 1.4209** − 1.4327** − 2.2389** − 1.4146*** − 0.0944
(0.7317) (0.6328) (1.0547) (0.2742) (0.1217)
HHI_Geo − 1.2852*** 0.0749 − 0.5462* − 0.4981** − 0.2779 0.1673*
(0.2217) (0.7248) (0.3624) (0.2683) (0.3352) (0.1143)
HHI_Type − 1.0673*** 0.4715* 0.2603 1.3025*** 0.4410 0.0728
(0.2063) (0.3141) (0.3867) (0.4723) (0.6372) (0.1107)
SIZE 0.3155*** 0.2441** 0.3356*** 0.0251 0.3121** − 0.0622
(0.0507) (0.1369) (0.1038) (0.2275) (0.1473) (0.0467)
D/E 0.0076 − 0.0767* 0.2726*** 0.0214 0.0861** − 0.0112*
(0.0413) (0.0518) (0.0782) (0.0644) (0.0403) (0.0082)
GROWTH 0.2269 0.3739** 0.3938 1.1123** 0.0507 − 0.0035
(0.5636) (0.2084) (0.5974) (0.4984) (0.2388) (0.0663)
25MSA 0.5140* − 0.2322 0.6336* 0.6454 − 0.5102** 0.0504
(0.3648) (0.2630) (0.4520) (0.7090) (0.2396) (0.1093)
LEASE − 1.8173 2.7584** − 0.9003 1.7934 0.4990
(1.8665) (1.1238) (1.9704) (2.0109) (0.4795)
ALTMAN 0.0211 0.0127 − 0.0335 − 0.0272 − 0.0006
(0.0200) (0.0467) (0.0683) (0.0252) (0.0075)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 1135 374 404 409 393 379
R2 0.3091 0.7663 0.6655 0.6834 0.8798 0.5789
supports a non-linear relationship between geographic concentration and operation effi-
ciency, consistent with Feng et al. (2019).
Compared to the baseline results in Table 2, we find that the impact of HHI_Type on 
NOI becomes negative. This reverse of relationship might be driven by the selection bias 
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that “core” REITs investing in core property types (i.e. office, industrial, retail and residen-
tial) are more likely to report tenant information. While it falls beyond the scope of this 
study, the results in Tables 2 and 4 suggest that the research on the relation between asset 
type concentration and REIT performance needs to be updated given that, in recent years, 
many “non-core” REITs, which invest in cell towers, data centers, single-family rentals, 
and other “specialty” property types, have come to the market.
The results on market valuations and the determinants of the discount factor by using 
the Heckman two-stage regressions are presented in Table  5. We can see that they are 
largely consistent with the main results in Table 3, except for the dividend growth. While 
HHI_Tenant no longer impacts on DIVGROWTH (Model 5) after controlling for the selec-
tion bias, it still has a significantly negative impact on TURNOVER, which strengthens our 
argument that REITs with more concentrated tenant base experience higher liquidity risk 
which is then “punished” by the market valuations. Overall, we eliminate the concern that 
our results might be sizably affected by the potential selection bias.
5.2  Focused versus diversified
While we control for the exact level of asset type concentration by using the Herfindahl 
index as defined by Eq.  3 (HHI_Type), it is natural to question whether our results are 
driven by focused REITs only as focused REITs are more likely to have a more concen-
trated tenant base compared to diversified REITs. Following the REIT literature, focused 
REITs are defined as REITs solely investing in one type of property and diversified REITs 
are those investing in two or more types of properties. To test whether there is a systematic 
difference between diversified and focused REITs, we run all models on a sub-sample of 
focused REITs only. The results on the operating performance and market valuations are 
reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. Overall, the main results on operating and valua-
tion measures do not change much. The coefficient of HHI_Tenant on OPCOST is largely 
improved to a significance level of 1%, suggesting that the effect of a concentrated tenant 
base on property operating expenses is amplified if the REIT also adopts a focused strat-
egy for its asset types. We also find that the lease term maturity no longer has an effect on 
corporate-level cash flows, implying that the long-term leases are more valuable for diver-
sified REITs. We also run all regressions on a sub-sample of diversified REITs only and 
use Chow statistics to test the systematic difference between these two sub-samples. The 
result suggests that our findings are not driven by one group only and it is appropriate to 
treat our sample as a whole. Overall, we believe that our results are not driven by focused 
REITs only.
5.3  Anchor tenant
Liu and Liu (2013) record an amplification effect of the anchor tenants and find that 
the failure of an anchor tenant has a magnified impact on the REIT performance. If, 
however, the REIT has a diversified tenant base, its revenue exposure to the anchor ten-
ant could be limited. Given that REITs adopting a more concentrated tenant base are 
more likely to have anchor tenants, it is sensible to raise concerns over whether our 
results are driven by a concentrated tenant base or the existence of anchor tenants. As 
an extra robustness test, we create a variable (ANCHOR), which is the revenue share of 
the largest tenant of a given REIT, to control for the potential anchor tenant effect. The 
results on operating performance and market valuations are reported in Tables 8 and 9 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Concentrate or diversify? The relationship between tenant…
1 3
respectively. HHI_Tenant no longer has an impact on RENT and NOI after including the 
anchor tenant effect, which supports the argument by Wheaton (2000) and Liu and Liu 
(2013) that the anchor or dominant tenants are more likely to pay lower base rents as a 
reward for their “brand” drawing power. However, as a concentrated tenant base is still 
associated with lower expenses (Model 4 and 5), the impact of tenant concentration on 
corporate cash flows remain significantly positive (Model 6). We can see from Table 9 
that the coefficients of HHI_Tenant on all valuation measures remain significantly nega-
tive, strongly consistent with the main results in Table 3, reinforcing the concentration 
discount effect of the underlying tenants. Overall, we believe that our results on the ten-
ant concentration are not driven by the anchor tenant effect.
Table 7  Tenant concentration, liquidity, growth and valuation: excluding diversified REITs
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015, excluding diversified REITs. The dependent variables are three different valuation 
measures including price-to-FFO (P/FFO), market-to-Book value (M/B) and Tobin’s Q (Q), as well as two 
determinants for the discount factor including the turnover which is the total value of the trading volume of 
a company for a given year divided by the end-of-year outstanding value of the common stocks (TURNO-
VER) and the dividend growth rate (DIVGROWTH). The variable of interest is the tenant concentration 
which is measured by the Herfindahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Ten-
ant). The geographic concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo) based on the 
shares of assets across MSAs. We also control for the long-term lease (LEASE), which is the share of base 
rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the 
current fiscal year, and the tenant quality measured by the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). The other control 
variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company measured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-
transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the 
growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); and the total share of properties located in MSA 
regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of REIT types (TYPE). Standard errors are in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively





HHI_Tenant − 0.8862** − 1.1988* − 1.0687 − 1.0861*** − 0.1134***
(0.4591) (0.7636) (1.2807) (0.3632) (0.0388)
HHI_Geo 0.1947 0.0074 − 0.1830 0.3714 0.0565**
(0.3896) (0.2204) (0.2135) (0.3022) (0.0261)
SIZE 0.1424* 0.2304** 0.1111 0.3576* 0.0042
(0.0971) (0.1095) (0.2162) (0.2629) (0.0324)
D/E − 0.1319*** 0.2633*** − 0.1343* 0.0205 − 0.0003
(0.0413) (0.0738) (0.0995) (0.0501) (0.0134)
GROWTH 0.4550*** 1.0275 1.3019*** − 0.0810 − 0.0448
(0.1365) (0.7962) (0.3954) (0.2417) (0.0513)
25MSA 0.0195 − 0.1075 0.8246* − 0.2959* − 0.0085
(0.2845) (0.4628) (0.5706) (0.1760) (0.0467)
LEASE − 1.9350 1.5709* − 0.8402 4.2401** 0.0839
(1.7789) (0.9351) (1.5324) (2.2462) (0.2405)
ALTMAN 0.0060 − 0.0036 − 0.0760 − 0.0625*** 0.0157***
(0.0159) (0.0390) (0.0947) (0.0234) (0.0057)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 330 351 357 346 334
R2 0.6591 0.6224 0.6378 0.8701 0.4380
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5.4  Alternative measure of tenant concentration
We also test the appropriateness of our HHI measure of tenant concentration by replac-
ing it with an alternative ad hoc measure which is the log-transformed number of tenants 
at REIT level (Tenant_No.). The results on operating performance and market valuations 
Table 8  Tenant concentration and REIT operating performance: anchor tenant effect
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015. The six dependent variables are different measures of the operating performance 
including the gross rental income (REIT), net operating income (NOI), property operating expenses 
(OPCOST), general and administrative expenses (G&A), interest expenses (INTEREST), and funds from 
operations (FFO), all presented as a share of the total assets. The variable of interest is the tenant con-
centration which is measured by the Herfindahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each ten-
ant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic and property type concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl 
index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based on the shares of assets across MSAs and property 
types respectively. We also control for the long-term lease (LEASE), which is the share of base rents to be 
received from operating leases expiring during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current 
fiscal year, and tenant quality measured by the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). Moreover, we control for the 
anchor tenant effect (ANCHOR) which is the revenue share of the largest tenant for each REIT. The other 
control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company measured by its market capitalization (SIZE), 
log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by the book value of equity (D/E); 
the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); and the total share of properties located in MSA 
regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of REIT types (TYPE). Standard errors are in the 













HHI_Tenant 0.0185 0.0229* − 0.0201* − 0.0224*** − 0.0152*** 0.0605***
(0.0271) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0123)
HHI_Geo 0.0227** 0.0020 0.0256*** 0.0006 − 0.0044* 0.0058
(0.0113) (0.0092) (0.0076) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0104)
HHI_Type − 0.0056 0.0201** − 0.0097** − 0.0031 − 0.0036* 0.0269***
(0.0121) (0.0081) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0094)
SIZE − 0.0010 − 0.0136*** − 0.0000 − 0.0026*** − 0.0011** − 0.0099***
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0032)
D/E 0.0020 0.0026 0.0003 − 0.0008*** 0.0041*** − 0.0008
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0018)
GROWTH − 0.0308** − 0.0075 − 0.0169** − 0.0034 − 0.0132*** 0.0091
(0.0132) (0.0098) (0.0090) (0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0115)
25MSA − 0.0358*** − 0.0230** − 0.0115** − 0.0067*** − 0.0111*** − 0.0052
(0.0112) (0.0105) (0.0063) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0098)
LEASE 0.0152 0.0633** 0.0824*** − 0.0175* 0.0008 0.0800**
(0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0300) (0.0129) (0.0119) (0.0342)
ALTMAN 0.0004 0.0003 0.0031*** − 0.0008*** 0.0001 0.0009
(0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0012)
ANCHOR 0.0116*** − 0.0092 − 0.0020 0.0014 0.0075** − 0.0180**
(0.0044) (0.0102) (0.0072) (0.0015) (0.0038) (0.0080)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 361 426 426 426 426 426
R2 0.5614 0.4904 0.5191 0.3919 0.5729 0.4925
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Table 9  Tenant concentration, liquidity, growth and valuation: anchor tenant effect
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015. The dependent variables are three different valuation measures including price-to-
FFO (P/FFO), market-to-Book value (M/B) and Tobin’s Q (Q), as well as two determinants for the discount 
factor including the turnover which is the total value of the trading volume of a company for a given year 
divided by the end-of-year outstanding value of the common stocks (TURNOVER) and the dividend growth 
rate (DIVGROWTH). The variable of interest is the tenant concentration which is measured by the Herfind-
ahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic and property 
type concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based 
on the shares of assets across MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the long-term lease 
(LEASE), which is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the sixth 
and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year, and the tenant quality measured by the Altman 
Z-score (ALTMAN). Moreover, we control for the anchor tenant effect (ANCHOR) which is the revenue 
share of the largest tenant for each REIT. The other control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT 
company measured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as 
the total debt divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the growth rate of the real estate investments 
(GROWTH); and the total share of properties located in MSA regions (25MSA). We also control for the 
fixed effect of REIT types (TYPE). Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance 
level at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
Dependent vari-
able





HHI_Tenant − 1.0555** − 1.1426*** − 2.0594** − 1.6941*** 0.0080
(0.4934) (0.4373) (0.8718) (0.5369) (0.0882)
HHI_Geo 0.2361 0.1481 − 0.3424* − 0.0291 0.0826
(0.3786) (0.2227) (0.2190) (0.1064) (0.0819)
HHI_Type 0.1477** 0.7224*** 1.1342*** 0.6678* 0.0762
(0.0843) (0.2197) (0.3252) (0.4098) (0.0862)
SIZE 0.1381** 0.2502*** 0.2369 0.2630* − 0.0213
(0.0667) (0.0730) (0.1830) (0.1576) (0.0367)
D/E − 0.0895** 0.2733*** 0.0455 0.0808** 0.0055
(0.0370) (0.0672) (0.0435) (0.0389) (0.0106)
GROWTH 0.3621** 0.6574 1.1666*** − 0.0374 0.0222
(0.1684) (0.5555) (0.4369) (0.2123) (0.0465)
25MSA 0.0178 0.0534 0.3756 − 0.5871*** − 0.0436
(0.1604) (0.2306) (0.3746) (0.2145) (0.0678)
LEASE − 1.1105 3.6642*** − 0.7929 1.4308 0.1204
(1.1602) (0.7502) (1.6315) (1.5059) (0.4657)
ALTMAN 0.0053 − 0.0043 − 0.0204 − 0.0411* 0.0089*
(0.0169) (0.0307) (0.0460) (0.0292) (0.0064)
ANCHOR 0.3230* − 0.3049 0.2648 0.5132 − 0.1687
(0.2030) (0.3879) (0.2228) (0.4386) (0.1419)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 390 419 425 409 395
R2 0.6810 0.6375 0.6387 0.8580 0.5591
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are reported in Tables 10 and 11 respectively. As Tenant_No. is a diversification or disper-
sion measure, we expect the coefficients to be opposite to HHI_Tenant. We can see from 
Table 10 that the more tenants a REIT company has the higher expenses it incurs, hence 
the lower corporate-level cash flow it generates, which are consistent with the results on 
tenant concentration. However, we do not find any significant impact of tenant numbers 
on the valuation measures, implying that HHI is a better measure of the level of tenant 
concentration. Two REITs with the same number of tenants could present very different 
profiles of tenant concentration.
Table 10  Tenant concentration and REIT operating performance: number of tenants
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs across 
2003 and 2015. The six dependent variables are different measures of the operating performance including the 
gross rental income (REIT), net operating income (NOI), property operating expenses (OPCOST), general and 
administrative expenses (G&A), interest expenses (INTEREST), and funds from operations (FFO), all presented 
as a share of the total assets. We use an alternative measure to proxy for the tenant concentration which is the 
total number of tenants for each REIT (Tenant_No.). The geographic and property type concentration is also 
measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based on the shares of assets across 
MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the long-term lease (LEASE), which is the share of 
base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the 
current fiscal year, and tenant quality measured by the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). The other control variables 
are as follows: the size of the REIT company measured by its market capitalization (SIZE), log-transformed; 
the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by the book value of equity (D/E); the growth rate of the 
real estate investments (GROWTH); and the total share of properties located in MSA regions (25MSA). We also 
control for the fixed effect of REIT types (TYPE). Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, * denote sig-












Tenant_No 0.0015 − 0.0032** 0.0083*** 0.0016** 0.0024*** − 0.0071***
(0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014)
HHI_Geo 0.0132* 0.0009 0.0198*** 0.0011 − 0.0044* 0.0042
(0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0067) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0075)
HHI_Type − 0.0143 0.0181*** − 0.0113*** − 0.0053** − 0.0051** 0.0285***
(0.0158) (0.0065) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0079)
SIZE − 0.0021 − 0.0133*** − 0.0020* − 0.0023*** − 0.0012* − 0.0098***
(0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0030)
D/E 0.0043 0.0028* 0.0007 − 0.0008*** 0.0041*** − 0.0005
(0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0016)
GROWTH − 0.0250 − 0.0022 − 0.0159** − 0.0034* − 0.0129*** 0.0141
(0.0189) (0.0122) (0.0081) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0145)
25MSA − 0.0295** − 0.0204** − 0.0112* − 0.0043** − 0.0096*** − 0.0065
(0.0144) (0.0098) (0.0067) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0095)
LEASE − 0.0590* 0.0416* 0.0563** − 0.0143 − 0.0001 0.0560**
(0.0412) (0.0287) (0.0278) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0296)
ALTMAN 0.0008 0.0001 0.0030** − 0.0007** 0.0000 0.0008
(0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0012)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 364 429 429 429 429 429
R2 0.5623 0.4856 0.5503 0.3527 0.5801 0.4904
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5.5  Other robustness tests
Finally, we also run a series of other robustness tests to further strengthen our findings 
and results are presented in Table 12. For parsimonious reasons, we only report the results 
on the variable of interest—HHI_Tenant while the same group of control variables are 
included in the specifications. Firstly, to eliminate the concern that our results are driven by 
a few REITs with a 100% tenant concentration, we exclude those REITs with HHI_Tenant 
Table 11  Tenant concentration, liquidity, growth and valuation: number of tenants
This table reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth regressions based on a panel of US Equity REITs 
across 2003 and 2015. The dependent variables are three different valuation measures including price-to-
FFO (P/FFO), market-to-Book value (M/B) and Tobin’s Q (Q), as well as two determinants for the discount 
factor including the turnover which is the total value of the trading volume of a company for a given year 
divided by the end-of-year outstanding value of the common stocks (TURNOVER) and the dividend growth 
rate (DIVGROWTH). We use an alternative measure to proxy for the tenant concentration which is the total 
number of tenants for each REIT (Tenant_No.). The geographic and property type concentration is also 
measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respectively) based on the shares of assets 
across MSAs and property types respectively. We also control for the long-term lease (LEASE), which is the 
share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the sixth and thereafter fiscal years 
following the current fiscal year, and the tenant quality measured by the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN). The 
other control variables are as follows: the size of the REIT company measured by its market capitalization 
(SIZE), log-transformed; the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by the book value of equity 
(D/E); the growth rate of the real estate investments (GROWTH); and the total share of properties located 
in MSA regions (25MSA). We also control for the fixed effect of REIT types (TYPE). Standard errors are in 
the parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively





Tenant_No 0.1134 0.0980 0.0125 − 0.0225** − 0.0204*
(0.0916) (0.0946) (0.0292) (0.0106) (0.0124)
HHI_Geo 0.2758 0.1986 − 0.1200*** − 0.0231** − 0.0365**
(0.3383) (0.2257) (0.0420) (0.0121) (0.0148)
HHI_Type 0.0929 0.4722*** 0.0076 − 0.0117 − 0.0030
(0.0735) (0.1793) (0.0451) (0.0129) (0.0092)
SIZE 0.1303*** 0.2795*** 0.0514* − 0.0123 − 0.0038
(0.0474) (0.0616) (0.0369) (0.0100) (0.0145)
D/E − 0.0841** 0.2461*** 0.0194 0.0174** 0.0222**
(0.0337) (0.0704) (0.0173) (0.0088) (0.0120)
GROWTH 0.3116** 0.5355 − 0.1968** − 0.0539* − 0.0914**
(0.1462) (0.5123) (0.0848) (0.0344) (0.0491)
25MSA 0.1043 0.2260 − 0.0597 − 0.0439*** − 0.0588**
(0.1755) (0.2286) (0.0878) (0.0129) (0.0232)
LEASE − 0.9134 3.1154*** − 0.1215 − 0.1007 − 0.0899
(1.0853) (1.0416) (0.3300) (0.0793) (0.0719)
ALTMAN 0.0004 − 0.0056 0.0100 0.0015 0.0023
(0.0171) (0.0286) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0060)
TYPE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 393 422 422 422 422
R2 0.6820 0.6221 0.8522 0.8876 0.9372
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equal to 1 (Panel A). Secondly, we use two alternative measures of the anchor tenant effect: 
we identify the anchor tenants for retail REITs only as one might argue that this is a phe-
nomenon exclusive to the retail sector (Panel B); we also follow Liu and Liu (2013) and 
identify only tenants with a revenue contribution over 50% as anchor tenants (Panel C). 
Thirdly, the impact of tenant concentration might be distorted by the extreme credit ratings 
of the dominant tenants. We account for this by adding a control variable for the credit rat-
ing of the largest tenant of each REIT (Panel D). Lastly, as REITs with more properties are 
more likely to have a more dispersed tenant pool, we scale the number of tenants by the 
number of properties owned by each REIT (Panel E). The results are presented in Panel E. 
We can see from Table 12 that our findings survive through all these extra robustness tests. 
Overall, the robustness tests strengthen our findings and show that tenant concentration 
matters significantly to the operating performance and valuations of REITs.
6  Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of tenant concentration on REITs operating perfor-
mance and market valuations. We use the Herfindahl index to measure the level of tenant 
concentration for a given REIT company based on the revenue attribution by each ten-
ant. While the impact of tenant concentration on property-level cash flows is inconclusive, 
we document a significantly positive relationship between tenant concentration and REIT 
corporate cash flows, driven by the reduced management and financial expenses associ-
ated with a concentrated tenant base. However, this improved cash flow does not trans-
late into firm value as we identify a concentration discount effect that REITs with a more 
concentrated tenant base experience lower market valuations, which is in sharp contrast to 
previous studies supporting a diversification discount effect (Capozza and Seguin 1999; 
Cronqvist et  al. 2001; Campbell et  al. 2003; García and Norli 2012; Ro and Ziobrowski 
2012). We argue that the concentration discount is fundamentally driven by the increased 
risk, hence discount factor, associated with a more concentrated tenant base, in line with 
the business research literature which believes that the corporate risk is increased when 
relying on concentrated customers (Kwak and Kim 2020; Lee et al. 2020). Our results hold 
after we control for various tenant characteristics, geographic and property type concentra-
tion and stand through a variety of robustness tests. Our findings imply that it is not just 
the lease structure and the tenant quality that matter to REITs, tenant concentration also 
directly impacts on REITs performance. This study also provides evidence that a supplier 
relying on a concentrated customer base can benefit from the improved operating efficiency 
as well as suffering from the increased risk. We believe that this study draws attention 
to the importance of the underlying tenants and sheds some light on future studies about 
REITs and customer concentration.
Appendix
See Table 13.
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Table 13  Correlation coefficient matrix
This table presents the correlation coefficients between variables. The operating performance measures 
include the gross rental income (REIT), net operating income (NOI), property-level aggregated operat-
ing expenses (OPCOST), general and administrative expenses (G&A), interest expenses (INTEREST), and 
funds from operations (FFO), all presented as a share of the total assets. Market valuations include price-
to-FFO (P/FFO), market-to-book value (M/B) and Tobins Q (Q). The tenant concentration is measured by 
the Herfindahl index based on the rental avenue attributed to each tenant (HHI_Tenant). The geographic 
and property-type concentration is also measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI_Geo and HHI_Type respec-
tively) based on the shares of assets across MSAs and property types respectively. LEASE measures the 
long-term lease which is the share of base rents to be received from operating leases expiring during the 
sixth and thereafter fiscal years following the current fiscal year. ALTMAN is the Altman Z-score for the 
tenant quality. SIZE is the market capitalization of the REIT company, log-transformed in the regressions. 
D/E is the financial leverage defined as the total debt divided by the book value of equity. GROWTH is the 
growth rate of the real estate investments. 25MSA is the total share of properties located in MSA regions. 
TURNOVER is the total value of the trading volume of a company for a given year divided by the end-of-
year outstanding value of the common stocks. DIVGROWTH IS the dividend growth rate
HHI_Ten-
ant
HHI_Geo HHI_Type RENT NOI OPCOST G&A INTEREST FFO
HHI_Tenant 1
HHI_Geo − 0.01 1
HHI_Type 0.17 0.02 1
RENT 0.19 0.15 − 0.06 1
NOI − 0.31 0.32 − 0.13 0.62 1
OPCOST 0.32 − 0.24 0.01 0.63 0.12 1
G&A 0.05 − 0.08 − 0.09 − 0.06 − 0.10 0.12 1
INTEREST − 0.32 0.01 − 0.38 0.33 0.53 0.09 − 0.12 1
FFO 0.41 − 0.21 0.17 0.51 − 0.04 0.90 − 0.14 − 0.23 1
P/FFO − 0.05 0.08 0.13 − 0.25 − 0.24 − 0.02 0.15 − 0.38 0.07
M/B 0.04 − 0.16 0.20 − 0.01 − 0.13 0.40 0.10 − 0.26 0.45
Q − 0.10 − 0.15 − 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.43 0.13 0.03 0.36
SIZE − 0.22 0.10 0.08 − 0.09 0.10 − 0.26 − 0.18 − 0.13 − 0.15
D/E − 0.18 0.21 − 0.18 0.01 0.22 0.00 − 0.11 0.36 − 0.09
GROWTH 0.04 0.01 0.04 − 0.31 − 0.32 − 0.03 − 0.02 − 0.37 0.11
25MSA − 0.15 0.04 0.11 − 0.33 − 0.04 − 0.32 − 0.21 0.02 − 0.26
TURNOVER − 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.15 − 0.22 − 0.13 0.09 − 0.21
DIVGROWTH 0.04 − 0.05 0.14 − 0.04 − 0.08 0.04 0.03 − 0.03 0.04
LEASE − 0.21 0.02 − 0.15 0.00 0.24 − 0.06 − 0.12 0.30 − 0.13
ALTMAN − 0.22 − 0.11 0.05 − 0.16 0.06 − 0.13 − 0.16 − 0.05 − 0.06








Q 0.46 0.64 1
SIZE 0.19 0.09 0.21 1
D/E − 0.13 0.04 0.27 − 0.07 1
GROWTH 0.21 0.23 0.07 − 0.14 0.04 1
25MSA 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.20 − 0.02 1
TURNOVER − 0.14 − 0.22 − 0.15 0.45 0.05 − 0.20 0.02 1
DIV-
GROWTH
0.04 0.11 0.12 0.00 − 0.05 0.01 − 0.07 − 0.09 1
LEASE 0.01 − 0.06 0.22 0.19 0.30 − 0.21 0.15 0.05 − 0.05 1
ALTMAN 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.19 − 0.01 0.04 0.26 − 0.08 − 0.01 0.19 1
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